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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PUBLIC TRANSIT DISTRICT MUST
ACCEPT CONTROVERSIAL ADVERTISING; OPENING OF "PUBLIC
FORUM" REQUIRES STATE AGENCY TO GIVE EQUAL ACCESS TO
MEANS OF ExPRESSION. Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit
District (Cal. 1967).
Intending to display posters attacking the war in Vietnam, an
organization known as "Women for Peace" attempted to purchase
advertising space in buses operated by a public transit authority.
Space for these posters was refused because of the transit authority's
established policy1 of accepting for display only commercial adver-
tising or political messages concerning current ballot issues. The
officers of "Women for Peace" sought an injunction to compel the
transit district to accept their advertising. The injunction was granted
by the trial court on grounds that refusal to accept the advertising
constituted a denial of the first amendment freedom of speech.
On appeal to the California Supreme Court, held, affirmed: A state
instrumentality which opens its facilities for use in the expression of
ideas cannot refuse to give access to those facilities for the expression
of ideas protected by the first amendment. Wirta v. Alameda-Contra
Costa Transit District, 68 Adv. Cal. 46, 434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal. Rptr.
430 (1967).
Wirta joins an emerging body of law dealing with the right of
access to communication media; this right is sometimes called free-
dom of the "forum." '2 The law involved has been formulated in the
varied contexts of civil rights demonstrations,3 labor movements,4
Jehovah's Witnesses' solicitations," and political party memberships.0
The basic issue involved in all these cases is: Does a person wishing
1 This policy was first established in 1961 to the effect that "[plolitical advertise-
ments and advertisements on local or national controversial subjects are not acceptable
unless approved by District." This was supplemented on July 26, 1962, to read that
political advertising on current ballot issues could be accepted on an equal space
opportunity basis. Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District, 253 Adv. Cal. App.
507, 509-10, 61 Cal. Rptr. 419, 420-21 (1967).
2 Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louislana, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 1.
3 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (right to use statehouse grounds
for protest assembly).
4 AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941) (right to use streets for union protest without
requirement of employment relation with abutting property owner).
5 Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (right to use public sidewalks for dis-
semination of leaflets).
0 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (right to participate in public meeting).
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to espouse views publically have a right to use communication facil-
ities which he neither owns nor personally controls ?7
Broadly speaking, freedom of the "forum" consists of: (1) first
amendment rights to freedom of speech and of the press (sometimes
referred to as the freedom of expression); and (2) the fourteenth
amendment right to equal protection under the law.8
The first amendment rights were intended by the framers of the
Constitution to subdue governmental censorshipY Because of the
social and economic conditions at that time, effectuation of this intent
increased the ability of a person to publically present his views.10 Sub-
sequent judicial constructions were primarily concerned with defining
the limits of this right. 1 Through the application of the fourteenth
amendment, state governments became subject to the same restric-
tions.'2 At the same time, freedom of expression was recognized as
one of the fundamental liberties which could not be denied without
due process.'3
The degree to which the principle of equal protection has become
involved in the states' relation to first amendment rights is illustrated
by the 1946 California case of Danskin v. San Diego Unified School
District,14 upon which Justice Mosk, speaking for the majority in
Wirta, places his principal reliance. Danskin involved a request by
the American Civil Liberties Union for permisson to use a public
school auditorium. The court held15 that while there is no obligation
7 See generally Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80
HARv. L. REV. 1641 (1967); Gorlick, Right to a Forum, 71 DicK. L. REv. 273 (1967).
8 Kalven, supra note 2, at 29.
9 1 T. EMERSON, D. BABER AND N. DOESEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 31 (3rd ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as EMERSON]; Meiklejohn, What
Does the First Amendment Mean? 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 461 (1953). Some interesting
cases on this point are Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245 (1936);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-16 (1931); and Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S.
454, 462 (1907).
10 Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE LJ. 877
(1963).
11 See EMERSON, supra note 9, at 29-55.
12 KAUPER, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 127 (1962).
13 The applicability of first amendment freedoms to the states as a part of due
process was first assumed for the sake of argument in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925), then maintained in a concurring opinion by Justice Brandeis in Whitney
v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927), and finally adopted by the Court in Stromberg
v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
14 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946).
15 Support for this holding was found primarily in the case of Missouri ex rel.
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), which has subsequently been cited for its
statement of equal protection theories in regard to civil liberties in education. E.g.,
21 S. CAL L. REv. 397 (1948); 37 MIcH. L. REv. 649 (1939).
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to allow general public use of school buildings, once such buildings
have been made available, the state cannot arbitrarily withhold their
use or impose conditions upon such use if abridgement of rights
guaranteed by the first amendment would result.'0
Although freedom of expression is a right which cannot be
abridged without due process, and which must be afforded without
unconstitutional distinctions between persons, a state may limit exer-
cise of this right to promote the health, safety, morals, and general
welfare of its people.' Further, it may-without exceeding the
authority given by the equal protection clause-regulate, in a con-
sistent fashion, the time, place, extent and duration of the use of
its facilities.' 8
The extent of these powers has been clarified by the recent Third
Circuit Court of Appeals case of Avins v. Rutgers,0 which arose from
the rejection by a law review editor in a state supported law school
of an article submitted for publication. Remarking that the acceptance
or rejection of submitted materials involves the exercise of editorial
judgment, the court held that the writer had not established any right
to have his work included in the law review. 0 Because of the unique
characteristics of a law review as a means of communication, the
editors are vested with broad discretion in the selection of materials
appropriate to that medium.
Avins illustrates the idea that the actions of a state in regulating
the exercise of first amendment rights within the limits of the equal
protection clause are analogous to editorial discretion. This discretion,
arising from the manner in which the medium is held out to the
speaking and listening public, 2' can be exercised to refuse access.
When wielded within its proper scope, the exercise of this discretion
does not result in the abridgement of any constitutional rights.
Turning to an examination of possible extentions of the Wirta
16 28 Cal. 2d at 545, 171 P.2d at 891.
17 Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961); Carpenters and Joiners Union
v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942); Wirin v. Ostly, 191 Cal. App. 2d 710, 13 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1961).
18 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
19 385 F.2d 151 (3rd Cir. 1967).
20 Id. at 153.
21 See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (concurring opinion of
Justice Jackson).
The moving picture screen, the radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the sound
truck and the street comer orator have differing natures, values, abuses and
dangers. Each, in my view, is a law unto itself.
See generally Barron, supra note 7, at 1651.
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decision to other media, it will be assumed in each instance that the
copy which is offered for inclusion in the medium is appropriately
within the scope of the relevant editorial discretion, without which
the refusal of access could be justified. The essential consideration in
these extensions is the presence of "state action," or an acceptable
substitute sufficient to make the fourteenth amendment operative.
Unless the first amendment freedom of expression is directly invoked
because of federal involvement,2  the Wirta rule must operate through
the fourteenth amendment.
The requirement of "state action," originally enunciated in the
Civil Rights Cases,28 stems from the seemingly dear language of
section I of the fourteenth amendment. The full and exact meaning
of the term has, however, been the frequent subject of litigation.
The underlying principle indicating a finding of "state action" has
been viewed as a requirement that the action be sufficiently connected
with state power.2 This does not mean that the action must be
compelled by force of statutory enactment, or even constitute part
of the authorized activities of the responsible agency. 5 State action
is easily found if state authority has placed a person in a position
from which he can deny the constitutional rights of others.26
The medium of outdoor advertising was recently the subject of a
case in the New York Court of Appeals2 7 and provides an example
of a way in which Wirta might be extended. In that case the court
held that a municipality can, for aesthetic or other reasons, regulate
or prohibit outdoor advertising,28 without violating the federal or
state constitutions .2  The continued presence of outdoor advertising,
22 No explicit constitutional requirement of affording equal protection is placed on
the federal government. The implication of such a requirement as part of the fifth
amendment has been discussed in several cases, most particularly in Boiling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954), and to some extent in Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
See Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963) and Henderson v. United States,
231 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Cal. 1964) for lower court views.
23 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
24 Lewis, The Mfeaning of State Action, 60 COL. L. Rav. 1083 (1960).
25 United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
26 Crews v. United States, 160 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1947). See generally Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
27 Matter of Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d
22 (1967).
28 The regulation in Cromwell prohibited signs not relating to activities conducted
on the lot in which the sign was placed. Aesthetic consideration was elimination of
advertisements on vacant land.
29 32 ALBANY L. RaV. 224 (1967).
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in light of this zoning authority,30 is at the will or under the license
of the municipality, and could bring the medium within "state
action."
The activities of private individuals in their discharge of a public
franchise,31 the continuous use of public property,82 or the use of
property purchased from a public agency,83 have been instances for
a finding of "state action."34 It seems clear that what is considered
essential in these situations for the creation of state responsibility is
the ability of the state to control the activities involved.3 5 The broad
controlling power vested in municipalities over outdoor advertising
as a result of that New York case would seem to correspond quite
closely to this requirement.
Radio and television are also media of expression which have been
placed in private hands through governmental license.36 The licensing
authority is granted to the federal government by the commerce
clause 37 In one of the leading cases88 dealing with the authority of
the federal government to regulate these media, Justice Frankfurter
stated that the "right of free speech does not include ... the right
to use the facilities of radio without a license. 39
The federal licensing agency, the FCC, is specifically prohibited
from conducting censorship,40 which has been held to preempt the
field as to state censorship.4'
30 See generally Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), involving a unanimous
decision with regard to the District of Columbia urban renewal project, where the
Court said "[it is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community
should be beautiful as well as healthy," and further stated that once the public purpose
had been established the choice of means to accomplish that purpose lay with the legisla-
ture. Cf. Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives; A Reappraisal, 20 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 218 (1965).
31 Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960). The dissenting
opinion may be found at 292 F.2d 4.
32 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
33 Hampton v. Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962).
34 See generally Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 379 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1967) (cases
collected at 40-41).
3r 304 F.2d at 322.
36 Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J. LAw & ECON
15 (1967).
37 Pulitzer Publishing Co. v. FCC, 94 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1937); KFKB Broad.
casting Ass'n, Inc. v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
38 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
39 Id. at 227.
40 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1962).
41 Allen B. Dumont Laboratories v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153, cert. denied, 340 U.S.
929 (1950). A slight modification of this position to allow state regulation for purely
local problems was begun by Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry,
374 U.S. 424 (1963).
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Congress, recognizing at an early stage that the complete freedom
to determine program content, unrestrained by either federal or state
agencies, might lead to undesirable private restriction of public access
to information, authorized the FCC to require a policy of "equal
time" for discussion of political issues.42 The doctrine has been often
litigated,43 expanded somewhat in scope, and renamed the "fairness"
doctrine.44
The "equal time" or "fairness" doctrines are to be distinguished
from Wlirta by the manner in which they can be invoked. Established
federal policies require the broadcaster to give access to the medium
only when he has previously chosen to give access to persons espous-
ing a contrary position. According to Wirta, any person, subject to
the editorial discretion associated with the particular medium, has a
right of access, regardless of the existence of a previously voiced
contrary position. The licensing of radio and television by the federal
government, as well as the public nature of the medium, would seem
to make these means of communication suitable soil into which a
Wlirta extension might take root. Having placed private individuals
in control of this public asset,45 constitutional sanction should be
available for violations of the first amendment by "governmental
representatives."
A rationale for finding state action involving the method of en-
forcing a refusal of access is suggested by the case of Shelley v.
Kraemer.46 Previous to Shelley it had been established47 that state
action may originate from the judicial as well as from the executive
and legislative branches of state government. Shelley held that even
though private individuals may practice discrimination without sub-
jecting themselves to constitutional sanctions, a resort by these indi-
viduals to judicial assistance escalates their actions into violations of
the equal protection provisions of the Constitution.4
42 Originally enacted as section 18 of the Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162, it was
carried forward substantially unchanged as section 315 of the Communications Act of
1934, now 47 U.S.C. § 315. See generally 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 86TH
CONG., FioST SEss. (1959), at 2564.
43 E.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1967) for cases
collected and discussed therein.
44 See FCC Public Notice of July 1, 1964, Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in
the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10416.
45 Barron, In Defense of "Fairness": A First Amendment Rationale for Broadcasting's
"Fairness" Doctrine, 37 U. CoL. L. REV. 31, 44-45 (1964). See also 13 VILL. L. REv.
393 (1968).
46 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
47 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879) (discrimination by judge in selection of
jury panel).
48 334 U.S. at 13.
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To see how this theory of state action through the judicial process
might be applied to possible extensions of lirta, suppose that a
private transit company, having an advertising policy identical to the
one described in Wirta, had refused access to the advertising offered
by "Women for Peace." If an injunction sought by the peace orga-
nization were refused, Shelley might arguably compel a finding of
state action as a result of that denial. 9 The action of the trial judge
would be state authority resulting in a denial of equal protection, or
at least in the active sanction of discriminatory practices.
The search for acceptable standards for limiting the application
of Shelley has produced no definite results, although it seems gener-
ally agreed that the fact of judicial intervention does not ipso facto
produce a denial of equal protection. One of the better articulated
formulations of a rule limiting Shelley, concludes that judicial power
cannot be used to sustain discrimination which the state itself would
be unable to commit or require.50
The Shelley rationale for "state action" would make possible a
substantial extension of Wirta and provide a reasonable course for
courts to follow. Wirta would be applicable to those media legiti-
mately termed public functions, but only under circumstances where
private individuals have opened a public forum.
Recent Supreme Court decisions have indicated that the search for
state action may become unnecessary to make fourteenth amendment
rights available."' In United States v. Guest 2 the court considered the
question of whether the federal government can legislate against
49 Some commentators have considered the possibility of extending the Shelley rule
in this fashion, and to some extent they advise caution for fear greater harm than
benefit will follow. Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes For a Revised Opinion, 110
U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1962); Comment, 21 LA. L. REV. 433 (1961). See Abernathy,
Expansion of the State Action Concept Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORN.
L.Q. 375, 408-12 (1958); Hellerstein, The Benign Quota, Equal Protection, and "The
Rule in Shelley's Case," 17 RUTG. L. REV. 531, 536-41 (1963); Lewis, The Meaning of
State Action, 60 CoL. L. REv. 1083, 1108-20 (1960); Comment, 50 CORN. L.Q. 473,
476-80 (1965). Cf. St. Antoine, Color Blindness But Not Myopia: A New Look At
State Action, Equal Protection and "Private" Racial Discrimination, 59 Mnc. L. Re.
993, 1000-02 (1961); Van Aistyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAr. L. Re. 3, 44-49
(1961).
50 Henkin, supra, note 49, at 490.
51 Frantz, Federal Power to Protect Civil Rights: The Price and Guest cases, 4 L. iN
TRANs. Q. 63 (1966); Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the "State Action"
Limit on the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 CoL. L. REV. 855 (1966).
52 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
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individual action under the authority of section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment.5 The Guest case dealt with a conviction under section
241 of the Federal Criminal Code 4 which prohibits conspiracies to
deprive persons of their civil rights.
From a composite reading of the majority and concurring opinions
it has been suggested 55 that Guest "eliminates state action as a condi-
tion precedent to the application of enforcement legislation enacted
under the fourteenth amendment."' 6 The elimination of the state
action requirement for enforcement of fourteenth amendment rights57
-even as against private individual action-has significance for a
possible extension of Wirta on the strength of two theories.
First, it would make current anti-discrimination legislation 8 ap-
plicable to individual requests for access to the "forum," even though
prior cases limited federal jurisdiction to occasions of deprivation of
rights through state action.59
Second, the language of the first amendment seems to place an
affirmative obligation on Congress to protect freedom of expression
from abridgement. Hence, even in the absence of positive restatement
of congressional intent that individuals have access to communication
media, the necessary mandate could be implied6 from the Constitu-
tion as part of the freedom of expression."' In other words, through
the authority of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, the funda-
mental freedom of expression as a preferred right under our federal
system would be made obligatory upon private individuals, by con-
sidering the first amendment as "appropriate legislation" required by
53 United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1963), held that this
clause is a grant of power equivilent to that granted by the necessary and proper clause.
54 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1950).
65 Comment, 55 CAL. L. Rar. 293 (1967). See also Anno. 16 L. Ed. 2d 243 (1967).
56 Comment, 55 CAL. L. REv. at 298.
57 Silard, supra note 51, at 872.
58 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), creates dvil action for deprivation of civil rights.
Cf. Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966), for construction of this statute
in terms of a denial of equal protection in a free speech context.
69 Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against
Private Acts, 73 YALa L.J. 1353 (1964).
00 United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82, 92 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333
U.S. 838 (1948). Rejecting a challenge to House Un-American Activities Committee
investigation, the court stated that "the courts are to presume, until the contrary appears,
that Congress will fulfill its obligation to defend and preserve the Constitution."
61 See Busey v. District of Columbia, 138 F.2d 592, 595 (1943), where court stated
that the burden of facts justifying interference with freedom of speech is on person who
denies invasion of constitutional right.
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section 5. Congress should be deemed to make a constant reaffirma-
tion62 of this right to means of exchanging ideas.
Several obstacles remain in the way of completely eliminating state
action as a part of the fourteenth amendment. First, the majority
opinion in Guest reaffirms the Court's approval of the state action
doctrine;6 however the concurring opinions indicate that in the
future it should not be considered.
Second, the tradition of state action leads the Court to speak in
terms of the right of equal access to state facilities, 5 rather than to
those privately owned.
To avoid these obstacles, some commentators have expressed" the
view that the Guest case indicates a return to the position taken by a
case67 which had fallen into disrepute decided only a few years after
the enactment of the fourteenth amendment. That case held that the
federal government could properly act, on the basis of section 5 of
the fourteenth amendment, to protect the rights of individuals in the
face of state inaction as opposed to private action. Federal action
would be justified on the states' affirmative duty to provide due
process and equal protection. Federal intervention forms the only
remedy for a breach of this duty.
In terms of Wirta this position would indicate that in the absence
of a state guarantee of access to a public forum, the federal govern-
ment could assure the free exercise of this vital right. A recalcitrant
publisher might then find the shadow of the federal government cast
across his doorstep.
Thus it is apparent that the possibilities for extension of Wlirta are
many, embracing a variety of other communication media. Whether
62 See DESCHLER, RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, (1957 ed.) § 229,
which notes the Congressional Oath of Office in the following form:
I, AB, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic;
that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation
freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and that I will
well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to
enter. So help me God.
83 383 U.S. at 755, where the leading cases are cited, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382
U.S. 296 (1966); United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 (1951); United States v.
Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882); and United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.'542 (1875).
64 383 U.S. at 762 (Justice Clark) and at 777 (Justice Brennan).
65 Id. at 775 (concurring opinion of Justice Brennan).
00 Comment, 5 DuQ. U.L. REv. 197 (1966); Comment, 13 How. L.J. 189 (1967);
Comment, 14 U.C.LA.L. REv. 553 (1967).
O7 United States v. Hall, Fed. Case. No. 15,282 (1871).
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this extension is accomplished under a theory of state action in the
form of the medium, state action in the manner of enforcing exclu-
sion, or direct action from federal guarantees, a growing need in our
society to express dissatisfaction will require extending Wirta.68
IkwiN L. SCHROEDER
08 Pollitt, Free Speech For Mustangs and Mavericks, 46 N.C.L. REv. 39 (1967).
